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Eric O'N. Fisher* 
Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 North High Street, 
Columbus, Ohio 43210 
This note shows that there are monetary equilibria in the model of overlapping 
generations that are in the core. Some equilibria have positive stocks of outside 
money in every generation. These equilibria are thus self-enforcing, and introducing 
money into an economy need not be tantamount to contriving a new social institution 
designed to enforce sequential contracts. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Let's return to Shell's [16] Gedankenexperiment in which George 
Washington, Spiro Agnew, and Buck Rogers are haggling over chocolates 
in an all souls' market. Imagine that Washington, Agnew, and Rogers take 
advantage of their serendipitous meeting and decide to hammer out a 
constitution describing the profile of the national debt. What would they 
agree on? Since they enjoy trading, they would likely restrict their attention 
to allocations that can be supported by Walrasian equilibria. Being 
enlightened souls, they might also seek a good faith profile of debt that 
implements Pareto optimal allocations. But here's the rub. Who gets the 
chocolate wrapper? Who gets the seigniorage in the creation of the 
national debt? George Washington is a statesman, but history has shown 
that Spiro Agnew will not give up without a fight. And Buck Rogers 
probably knows more monetary theory than both of them put together! By 
characterizing policies that support allocations in the core, this note 
describes the profiles of national debt that they would assent to. These 
* [ thank Gerry Garvey for the conversations on the road to the Goodradigbee that sparked 
my interest in this topic. I also am grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments helped 
greatly to sharpen the focus of this note. 
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policies have the added attraction that even if the Ayatollah reconvened the 
All Souls' Convention, then neither he nor his followers could propose 
a credible repudiation of the debt. Thus these plans are bona fide and 
time-consistent. 
In the simplest versions of models of overlapping generations, positive 
stocks of an outside asset may support Walrasian equilibrium allocations 
that are not in the core.1 The (loose) intuition is that agents in later 
generations have an incentive to renege on any generational debt they have 
inherited and then issue their own inside money as an asset for future 
generations. But this note describes economies in which every generation's 
temptation to renege on the stock of past debt is weaker than its gains 
from trade in each period. It extends the results of Esteban and Millan 
[10] to economies in which the present value of the stock of debt is not 
constant. Those authors show that Walrasian equilibria with constant 
positive stocks of outside assets cannot support equilibria in the core, and 
they conclude that Gale [13] was correct in emphasizing that introducing 
money into a Walrasian system was analogous to creating a new social 
institution. This note shows that such a conclusion may be true for many 
large economies, but it is not uniformly true for economies with only a 
few agents in each generation or for those where the gains from trade are 
especially high. 
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
The index set of agents is H=Tt=0 Ht , where Ht is the set of agents 
belonging to generation t. I allow T to be finite or infinite. Each agent 
h # H&H0 lives for two periods,2 but agent h # H0 lives for only one 
period. In each period t1, there are l commodities that cannot be stored. 
Hence the endowment of agent h # Ht , is  |h=(0, ..., |h 
t , |th 
+1 , 0, . . .), with 
|t t# Rl , and the consumption bundle of agent h # Ht , is  xh=(0, ..., xh + h , 
t+1 tx , 0, . . .), where again x # R+ 
l . The commodity space is X=Rl _h h + 
Rl _ } } } . The preferences of agent h # Ht , are summarized by uh : R2l  R+ +
 

t t+1
whose rule is uh(xh)=uh(xh ,  xh ).
3 
1 Hendricks et al. [14] showed that there are Walrasian equilibrium that are not in the 
core. Using a model with two agents per generation, Kovenock [15] showed that there are 
Pareto optimal Walrasian equilibrium that are not in the (empty) core. Esteban [8] described 
stationary debt policies that supported allocations in the core, and Esteban [9] gives an 
excellent survey of this literature. 
2 This assumption is not at all as restrictive as it may seem. Balasko et al. [2] give an 
algorithm for converting an arbitrary demographic structure into the one described here. 
3 Note that h # H0 is endowed with and consumes commodities only in the (first and) last 
period of her life and has a utility function uh : Rl +  R whose rule is uh(xh)=uh(x
1
h). 
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Agent h # Ht receives lump-sum transfers of a fiat asset mh=(0, ..., mth , 
t+1 t tm , 0, . . .), with m # R. If  m  <0, then h is taxed at time t. This agent's h	 	 h h 
t t+1gross additions to money holdings are yh=(0, ..., yh , yh , 0, . . .), with 
t t tyh # R.
4 Then yh&mh>0 if and only if h # Ht , saves during the first period 
of her life since she is committing to inventory more money than she 
receives in transfers.5 
Let pt # R+ 
l be the vector of commodity prices at time t. The sequence 
1	 	 t, iof such prices is p=( p , p2, . . .), where p is the present price of 
commodity (t, i) and the normalization is p1, 1=1. Now let qt # R+ be the 
price of the fiat asset at time t; then q=(q1, q2, . . .) is the sequence of 
present prices of the asset. 
Taking p and q as given, agent h # Ht chooses xh and yh to maximize 
uh(xh) 	(1)  
subject to 
(i) p } xh+q } yhp } |h+q } mh ; 
t t+1(ii) 0, 0; xh xh 
and 
t t+1(iii) yh+ yh 0. 
t t t+1Let Yh=(0, ..., yh , yh+ yh , 0, . . .) be the cumulative asset holdings 
=t 	 iof agent h # Ht .	 Consider also Mt	 mh , the sum ofi=1 h # H i&1 _ H i 
all injections of the fiat asset that have occurred up to time t. Then M= 
(M1, M2, . . .) is the profile of the stock of the fiat asset. 
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a sequence of goods and asset prices 
and a corresponding list of equilibrium allocations and asset demands, 
[( pt , qt)] t=1 and [(xh , yh)]h # H 
such that 
(i) (xh , yh) solves (1); 
(ii)	 	 : xh  : |h ; 
h # H h # H 
4 Agent h # H0 receives tax-transfers only in the last period of her life, and it is implicit that 
y0 h=0. 
5 This description of savings and borrowing follows Balasko and Shell [4, Section 2] 
exactly. 
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and 
(iii) : YhM.6 
h # H 
In a perfect foresight equilibrium, the present price of the fiat asset is a 
constant; hence, q=(q0,  q0, . . .) for some q0 # R+. Thus for h # Ht the real 
h+m
t+1effects of lump-sum tax-transfers depend only on the sum +h =mt h 
t t+1because q } mh =q0(mh+mh )=q
0+h . Then +=(+h)h # H is the government's 
generational policy.7 Let wh = p } |h+q0+h be the present value of an 
agent's income, xh = fh( p, wh) be the solution to (1), r=h # H |h be the 
stream of resources, and w=(wh)h # H be the sequence of incomes. Then 
( p, w) is a  price-income equilibrium associated with resources r if and only 
if h # H fh( p, wh)=r. The generational policy +=(+h)h # H is consistent with 
the price-income equilibrium ( p, w) if and only if wh = p } |h+q0+h for all 
h # H. 
A monetary equilibrium is a perfect foresight equilibrium in which q0>0 
and +{0. A monetary economy is a four-tuple E=(H,  |=(|h)h # H ,  += 
(+h)h # H ,  u=(uh)h # H) that has a monetary equilibrium. Let E(k) be the 
k-fold replication of E, consisting of k identical agents for each h # H. This 
definition includes replicating the endowment and tax-transfers of each 
agent in the original economy. 
A coalition is a non-empty subset of H. For any coalition S and 
assignment x=(xh)h # H ,  
FS(x)={r # X :  : zh =r for some assignment z such that h # S 
uh(zh)uh(xh) for all h # S, with strict inequality for some h # S= 
is the set of resources that allow these agents to improve upon x. For a 
coalition S, it will be convenient to use the notation |S =h # S |h and 
xS =h # S xh . Then a coalition V is relevant to another coalition S if for 
any feasible assignment x=(xh)h # H there exists some a>0 such that 
a|V+xS # FS(x). A coalition S is irreducible if, for any two coalitions U 
and V forming a partition of S, U is relevant to V. Finally, a feasible 
assignment x=(xh)h # H belongs to the core if |S  FS(x) for any coalition S. 
6 A referee pointed out that (1) has an indeterminate solution for money holdings since any yh 
t t+1such that yh+ yh =0 will satisfy this program. This observation is true, but there is only one 
such yh that is consistent with equilibrium since (iii) takes as given the pattern of taxes and trans­
fers. Thus utility maximization determines both yh
t &mt h and y
t
h 
+1 &mth 
+1 . It is convenient to think 
of (ii) as an equilibrium in the flows of commodities and (iii) as an equilibrium in the end-of­
period stocks of money. 
7 This apt terminology is that of Auerbach et al. [1].  
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3. THE CORE OF A MONETARY ECONOMY 
1 t # RlAt prices p=( p ,  p2, . . .) with p ++ for all t1, the expenditure 
necessary to achieve utility no less that u h is eh( p, u h)=min[ p  }  xh  |  uh(xh) 
u h]. I shall impose henceforth that each agent's utility function is 
continuous and represents preferences that are locally nonsatiated, and I 
will also consider only equilibria in which every present price is strictly 
positive. In this case, eh( p, u h) is continuous and increasing in u h . Consider 
now such a price sequence p and a fixed stream of endowments |=(|h)h # H . 
For every coalition S define B( p, S, |) as the difference between the value 
of the coalition's endowments and the maximal value of the consumption 
allocations it can provide its members, both evaluated at prices p. Thus 
B( p, S, |)# min {p } |S& : eh( p, uh(xh))= .  (2)  xS|S h # S 
Three properties of B( p, S, |) are noteworthy. First, this function is 
defined for all finite coalitions S. Second, if x =(x h)h # H is supported by p 
and x S =|S for some coalition S, then B( p, S, |)=0. Thus a coalition that 
is self sufficient has no gains from trade at prices p. Finally, since p } x h 
p } |h in an economy without money, B( p, S, |) is the value of market 
access that S achieves from trading with H&S at prices p.8 
Now consider explicitly the generational accounts +=(+h)h # H for 
the monetary economy E=(H,  |=(|h)h # H ,  +=(+h)h # H , u=(uh)h # H). 
I consider first the case where *H<. 
Proposition 1. Assume that there are only finitely many agents in E, 
and consider a price income equilibrium ( p, w). Then the equilibrium allocations 
are in the core if and only if +H=0 and 
&B( p, S, |)q0+S for any coalition S.  (3)  
Proof. Note first that Balasko and Shell [5, Proposition 3.2] establish 
that +H =h # H +h=0 is necessary for +=(+h)h # H to be consistent with 
( p, w). 
Let x =(x h)h # H be the equilibrium allocations, and assume that 
&B( p, S, |)q0+S for any coalition S. Then, for any non-empty 
S/H, minx S| S[ p  }  |S  &  h  #  S  eh(  p,  uh(xh))]  &q
0+S  . Hence, 
maxx S| S[h # S eh( p, uh(xh))]p } |S+q
0+S = p } x S , and |S  FS(x ). 
Thus the equilibrium allocations are in the core. 
8 For a finite coalition S, B( p, S, |)p } |S is akin to Debreu's [7] definition of economic 
loss for an economy with production. 
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Now assume that x =(x h)h # H are in the core. Then at goods prices p and 
asset price q0, maxx S| S[h # S eh( p, uh(xh))]p } x S = p } |S+q
0+S for 
any non-empty S/H. Hence, minx S|S[ p  }  |S&h  #  S  eh(  p,  uh(xh))]= 
B( p, S, |)&q0+S . Q.E.D 
The 2*H&1 inequalities and the one equality in Proposition 1 describe 
completely the set of generational policies that are consistent with ( p, w) 
and support allocations in the core of E. This set is closed and not empty 
since it contains the policy +h=0 for all h # H. Of course, the core of E is 
not empty because it contains the Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Also, 
the set of generational policies consistent with ( p, w) and supporting 
allocations in the core will typically have non-empty interior. Only if 
B( p, S, |)=0 for every S/H will this set consist of the singleton +h=0 
for all h # H. Thus there are non-trivial generational policies that support 
allocations in the core as long as at least one agent experiences strictly 
positive gains from trade in a given Walrasian equilibrium. 
Equation (3) states simply that no coalition can be taxed more than 
the value of its gains from trade. The practical interpretation of (3) is 
problematic because it entails constraints both on the profile of genera­
tional policies through time and the distribution of taxes across agents in 
the same cohort. Proposition 1 serves as a strong reminder that the 
distribution of taxes and transfers within each cohort matters in determining 
which policies support allocations in the core. With that proviso firmly in 
mind, I shall postulate that *Ht=1 in the rest of this note. This assumption 
allows a simple characterization of the dynamic profile of generational 
policies. 
In an economy with infinitely many agents, two problems crop up 
immediately. First, a coalition may consist of subsets of agents who have 
no feasible trades. Second, (2) may not be well defined for a coalition with 
infinitely many members. But (2) is well defined for all coalitions S such 
that *S< or *(H&S)<. In an economy with one agent per cohort, 
there is only one type of irreducible coalition with infinitely many members. 
Let St= ti=0 Hi ; then only infinite coalitions of the form H&S
t might 
improve upon a proposed allocation. Then we can consider some 
(x~ h)h # H&St that minimizes (2) for H&St .9 Since this coalition is self-sufficient 
B( p, H&St t+1 } (|t+1 &xt+1 ), from t+2 onward, , |)= p ~ which isH t+1 H t+1 
different from zero only if there are at least two goods per period. 
In an economy with only one good per period, any generation being 
taxed on net can block the equilibrium allocations by forming a coalition 
9 Assume that resources are uniformly bounded, and recall that eh( p, uh , (xh)) is a continuous 
function of xh . Then (2) defines (x~ h)h # H&St as an argument that minimizes a continuous 
bounded non-negative function on a domain that is compact in the product topology; hence 
these allocations exist for any coalition H&St . 
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consisting of its members only. But in an economy with at least two goods 
per period, such a coalition may not improve upon these allocations 
if trade between the generations is sufficiently important to outweigh 
the taxes needed to service the debt. Proposition 2 formalizes this 
intuition. 
Proposition 2. Assume that aggregate resources are uniformly bounded, 
and consider a price income equilibrium ( p, w) such that lim inft   & pt& 
=0. Then the equilibrium allocations are in the core if and only if 
lim inft   t =0, andi=0 +H i 
&B( p, St t , |)q0+stB( p,  H&s ,  |) for all t0. (4) 
Proof. Now Balasko and Shell [4, Proposition 5.5] show that 
lim inft   t =0 is necessary for +=(+h)h # H to be consistent with i=0 +H i 
( p, w). Also, the equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal since aggregate 
resources are uniformly bounded. Further, we need consider only 
irreducible coalitions since any other coalition cannot improve upon the 
equilibrium allocations. 
Let x =(x h)h # H be these allocations, and put +St =t . If  i=0 +Hi 
&B( p, S t , |)q0+S t then maxx S t|S t[h # St eh( p, uh(xh))]p } |St + 
q0+S t= p } x S t , and |S t  FS t (x ). Market clearing implies that 
p } (|H&St  &x  H&St)=q0+St . Hence, if q0+St B( p, H&S t , |), then 
p } (|H&St  &x  H&St)minx H&S t| H&S t[ p  }  |H&S t  &h  #  H&S t  eh(  p,  uh(xh))], 
and |H&S t  FH&St(x ). Finally, the grand coalition cannot improve upon 
x =(x h)h # H since these allocations are Pareto optimal; thus they are in the 
core. 
Assume now that x =(x h)h # H are in the core. Then at goods prices p and 
asset price q0, maxx S t|S t [h # St eh( p, uh(xh))]p } x St = p } |S t+q
0+S t 
for any finite t. Hence, minx S t|S t[ p  }  |St  &h  #  St  eh(  p,  uh(xh))]= 
B( p, St , |)&q0+S t for all finite coalitions St . Also, since q0+St = 
p } (|H&S t&x  H&St) is the present value of resources transferred 
from H&St to St , minx H&S t| H&S t [ p  }  |H&S t&h  #  H&S t  eh(  p,  uh(xh))] 
p } (|H&St&x  H&St). But this inequality implies that B( p, H&St , |)q0+S t . 
Q.E.D 
In Proposition 1, it was necessary to assume that +H=0. If there are 
finitely many agents in the economy, then +S=&+H&S and (3) implies 
immediately that &B( p, S, |)+SB( p,  H&S,  |). Thus (3) can be 
restated in a manner entirely analogous to (4), and it captures precisely the 
intuition that generational debt is a transfer of resources between two 
groups. In the case of an economy with one agent per cohort, (4) describes 
completely the set of generational polices that support allocations in the 
core. 
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Equation (4) generalizes Esteban's [8, Proposition 3] characterization of 
the core of a monetary economy in two directions. First, it shows that the 
assumption of weakly separable preferences is not necessary for a simple 
characterization of policies supporting allocations in the core. Second, it 
t+1 } |t+1allows for non-stationary policies. Since B( p, H&St , |)p H t+1 and 
resources are uniformly bounded, it is obvious that positive amounts of 
generational debt must eventually be retired. But this requirement is also 
imposed by the assumption that +=(+h)h # H is consistent with a price-
income equilibrium in Esteban and Millan's [10] classical set, a generalization 
of Gale's [12] notion of a classical equilibrium. 
In neither of these propositions was it necessary to make strong assump­
tions about preferences or endowments. Both propositions assumed the 
existence of an equilibrium with a valued fiat asset, and I was able to use 
the assumption of existence to characterize fully the set of generational 
policies that supported equilibrium allocations in the core. Still, the 
economy in Proposition 2 was small in the extreme, since only two agents 
trade in each period. Of course, it is interesting to see whether there are 
large economies with positive stocks of money in every period that support 
allocations in the core. 
Proposition 3. There are monetary economies E satisfying +St = 
ti=0 +H i >0 for all t0 that support equilibrium allocations in the core for 
every replication E(k). 
Proof. I will give an example of such an economy. 
Let *Ht=1 for all t0, and set l=2. Let |h=((2, 1),  (0, 0),  . . .)  if  
h  #  H0  and |h=((0,  0),  ...,  (0,  1), (2,  1), (0,  0),  . . .)  if  h  #  H&H0 . Let 
preferences be summarized by 
{ 
1, 2 log(min[x1, 1 h , xh ])
 

if h # H0
 
u(xh)= , xt, 2  , xt+1, 2 log(min[xt, 1  ])+log(min[xt+1, 1 ])h h h h 
if h # Ht , with t1. 
Since there is only one agent per generation, I can write +=(+h)h # H = 
)(+t t=0 without confusion. Let +=(1, &34, &316, . . .) and fix 0<q
0<15. 
t, 1  t, 2Then a perfect foresight equilibrium is supported by p = p = 
1, 1 (3&15q0)(13)t+20q0(14)t . The equilibrium allocations satisfy xh = 
1, 2 t, 1  t, 2x =(3+q0)2 if  h  #  H0 . Also, x =x =(1&(14)t&1 q0)2 andh h h
 

t+1, 1 t+1, 2
 
xh =xh =(3+(14)
t q0)2 if  h  #  Ht  with t1. 
Consider E(k), the k th replication of this economy. No coalition of the 
form H&St&1 can improve upon the equilibrium allocations because it is 
endowed with none of commodity (t, 1). Assume now that some coalition 
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including k1 agents in Ht&1 and k2 agents in Ht can improve upon these 
equilibrium allocations. Then endowments are such that the system of 
equations 
4k1>k1(3+(14)t&1 q0)+k2(1&(14)t&1 q0) 
2(k1+k2)>k1(3+(14)t&1 q0)+k2(1&(14)t&1 q0) 
must be true. These two equations are equivalent to k1&k2>(14)t&1 
_q0(k1&k2) and &(k1&k2)>(14)t&1 q0(k1&k2). Thus 0>k1&k2 . But 
then the first inequality is contradicted since 1>15(14)t&1 q0. Of  
course, since lim inft   & pt&=0, the equilibrium allocations are Pareto 
optimal and cannot be improved upon by the coalition of the whole. Thus 
the equilibrium allocations are in the core for every replication of the 
economy. Q.E.D 
The economy described in Proposition 3 does not contradict Esteban 
and Millan [10, Proposition 7] because the Gaussian curvature of each 
consumer's indifference curve evaluated at the equilibrium allocations 
is not bounded.10 But these preferences and endowments create such a 
strong inter-dependence on trade between generations that no coalition 
consisting of a subset of agents from two different generations can im­
prove upon the equilibrium allocations. Of course, this particular 
example is not robust because it depends so crucially on the fact that 
goods within each period are perfect complements in each agent's 
preferences. Since the example consists of an economy with irreducible 
coalitions, the proof points towards an extension of Chae and Esteban [6, 
Theorem 1]. 
A monetary equilibrium is in the core if the gains from trade between 
generations are sufficiently important.11 Also, the example shows that the 
present price of the asset matters; the well-being of the initial generation is 
increasing in the present value of the stock of debt of which it is the 
beneficiary. Further, the example is robust with respect to the generational 
policy underlying the monetary equilibrium. In one sense, there is nothing 
special about the monetary economy described in the proof. Indeed, 
economies in which trade between generations is important and whose 
long-run real interest rates exceed the rate of growth of resources may be 
the norm, not the exception, in our world. 
10 Balasko and Shell [4] use an assumption bounding this curvature in characterizing 
Pareto optimal allocations. 
11 Fisher [11] has argued that gains from trade between agents in the same generation are 
also important in describing monetary equilibria supporting allocations in the core. 
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